Abstract: Italy still lacks a nationwide rationally designed mechanism of income support. In this paper, we explore the feasibility and the optimal features of a universal policy of minimum income in Italy. We use a microeconometric model and a social welfare methodology in order to evaluate various alternative mechanisms. We simulate the effects and the social welfare performance of 15 reforms resulting from three versions of five basic types of income support mechanism: guaranteed minimum income (GMI), unconditional basic income (UBI), wage subsidy (WS) and two mixed systems: GMI with WS and UBI with WS. As a welfare evaluation criterion, we adopt the Gini Social Welfare function. All the reforms are calibrated so as to preserve fiscal neutrality. The optimal policy turns out to be a version of UBI with WS, namely an unconditional transfer covering 37.5% of the Poverty Level coupled with a 10% WS, with a total average benefit amounting to about 70% of the Poverty Level.
Introduction
In contrast to most European countries and despite recommendations on the part of the EC, Italy still lacks a sufficiently systematic and nationwide mechanism of income support. Various selective or conditional income maintenance policies are operating and some local authorities are experimenting forms of minimum income policy. However, the current economic recession has put much stress on the current income support policies, thus revealing their shortcomings with respect to both efficiency and equity. Against this background, it is hoped that evidence concerning the undesirable implications of current policies might produce a more favourable climate for debating the redesign of income support mechanisms based on a universalistic approach. At the moment, the Italian debate is not structured enough to indicate specific policies as candidates for a reform. As a contribution, in this paper we consider abstract types that in turn can include more specific policies and we empirically explore the feasibility and the "optimal" general features of a universal policy of income support for Italy. We aim at designing an income support mechanism that replaces the current policies and has desirable properties in terms of households' welfare and incentives, subject to public budget constraints and taking into account the households' new choices vis-a-vis the new opportunities and constraints introduced by the reforms.
The current system
Current Italian income support policies can be classified as contingent interventions (such as unemployment benefits) and structural (social assistance) interventions. The contingent interventions suffer from three main undesirable features: (a) they are aimed at preserving jobs rather than at improving the worker's income and opportunities -the labour reallocation from unprofitable jobs to more promising ones is severely discouraged; (b) they are limited to certain sectors and types of contract, thus generating social exclusion and processes of the insideroutsider type; (c) often some of the contingent interventions have to go through a bargaining process involving firms, unions and local or central authorities, thus adding more sources of potential inequities. In June 2012, the Italian Parliament approved a redesign of contingent interventions inspired by more universalistic principles but limited the changes to coverage of wage employees.
Anti-poverty interventions in Italy are mainly aimed at supporting low-income people over 65 (Assegno Sociale, Social Card), incapacitated disabled people (Pensione di Invalidita'), low-income mothers (Assegno di Maternita') and large low-income families (Assegno per il Nucleo Familiare, limited to wage employees). Embodied in the personal income taxation system, there are also tax credits and child benefits that can be classified as anti-poverty or social assistance policies. It has been observed though that the design of the mean-tested tax credits and child benefits create distortions and bad incentives for labour market participations of married women (Colonna & Marcassa, 2011) . Taken all together, these policies implement a sort of non-universal, categorical guaranteed minimum income (GMI) mechanism, which on top of the general problems associated with GMI (poverty traps, administrative costs, incentives to eligibility fraud), adds the shortcomings of a rather chaotic and poorly designed system. Overall, the empirical evidence suggests that the current Italian system of income support policies is defective with respect to both efficiency goals (e.g. minimizing distortions and supporting labour mobility) and equity goals (e.g. reducing poverty and economic insecurity).
1 In 1997 a governmental commission (Commissione Onofri) recommended the introduction of a universal minimum income support with the twin goals of combating poverty and favouring the mobility of labour between firms and across occupations, as a crucial element for a new general design of the Italian welfare state (Onofri (Ed.) 1997).
As a first start to implementing the proposal, in 1998 Reddito Minimo di Inserimento (RMI) -a limited form of minimum income transfer -was introduced in a number of municipalities in order to test its organizational feasibility. However in 2001, the RMI "experiment" was stopped. Moreover a partial constitutional reform transferred the responsibility for social assistance from the central government to the regional authorities (with a rather undecided institutional setting) and the project of a general and universal policy remained silent for almost a decade. Two relatively recent processes, however, can be considered as new sources of motivation for a systematic reform inspired by universalistic principles. The first is the worldwide crisis that started around 2008, with its implications of increasing unemployment and economic distress. The second is the growing proportion of people working in permanent conditions of low income and job insecurity (precariousness). While the large and increasing fraction of precarious jobs is a general phenomenon (Standing, 2011) , the Italian specific case has been defined as flex-insecurity: a marked separation between workers who continuously move from one precarious job to another and the rest of the labour force (Berton, Richiardi, & Sacchi, 2009 ). Among various potential responses, some type of universal income support would contribute to promote more inclusive and progressive forms of mobility and flexibility. Clearly, the effects of the macroeconomic crisis aggravate the problems and reveal the vast inadequacy of the current policies and the urgency for redesigning them.
Directions of reform
Against this background, we will consider various versions of hypothetical income support policies that -differently from the current policies described above -are universal, meaning that they are not conditional upon professional or occupational categories or on bargaining or contingent financial constraints.
As it is typically the case with universal policies, they are financed by general taxes. These reforms are stylized cases representative of the different scenarios that are discussed or even actually implemented in many countries.
2
The Appendix provides a graphical illustration of the reforms: although not necessary for the understanding of how the different mechanisms work, the graphs can offer a more analytical perspective.
In the following description of the hypothetical reforms, we will refer to a threshold G, which is defined as a proportion of the Poverty Level adjusted for the household's size. 3 In the simulation exercises, the proportion (or "coverage") will be alternatively set at 50%, 75% or 100%. As an example, suppose the Poverty Level (for a given type of household) is 1,000 Euros. If we set the coverage equal to 50% (say), then G will be equal to 500 Euros (for that type of household).
Guaranteed minimum income
Each individual is guaranteed a minimum level of income G, meaning that if (and only if) her/his own income falls below G she/he receives from the Government a transfer that covers the difference between G and own income. This is a simple version of the standard conditional guaranteed basic income, implemented in many countries. Since it is means tested, it is expected to bring the benefit of helping only the deserving population at a moderate cost. On the negative side, means testing has well-known drawbacks: (a) relatively high administrative costs: paper work, monitoring the eligibility and delivering the money; (b) negative effects on the incentive to work: especially for people with low wages, working might not be worthwhile since as long as the own (expected) income falls below G, the available income remains G (poverty-trap effect); (c) moral hazard issues, i.e. incentives to fraudulent declarations or behaviour.
2 For more detailed and technical presentations of this exercise, see Colombino (2011a Colombino ( , 2011b Colombino ( , 2012 . Examples of other recent contributions that address specific reforms are Aaberge, Colombino, and Strøm (2004) , Fumagalli (2006) , De Vincenti and Paladini (2009), Colombino, Locatelli, Narazani, and O'Donoghue (2010) , Figari (2011) and De Luca, Rossetti, and Vuri (2012) . 3 The Poverty Level for an individual is defined here as ½ of the median of the distribution of individual incomes.
Unconditional basic income
Each individual receives an unconditional transfer equal to G as defined above. This is the pure version of Basic Income, implemented in Alaska, expected to be implemented in Brazil, currently experimented in local areas of Africa and India. As compared to GMI, its benefits and drawbacks are exactly opposite. First, no poverty trap effect is to be expected. Second, an unconditional transfer is much cheaper to administer and no paper work for application is required. Third, there are no possible gains from false declarations or fraudulent behaviour. On the negative side, the policy is obviously more expensive than GMI since the transfer goes to everyone. This same characteristic is typically seen as undesirable since the "undeserving" are also receiving the transfer: in fact this turns out to be a false perspective as long as the policy is financed by higher taxes on higher incomes.
Wage subsidy
Each individual receives a 10% subsidy on the gross hourly wage and her/his income is not taxed as long as her/his gross income does not exceed G. Some currently fashionable policies such as Earned Income Tax Credit (USA), In-Work Benefits (UK) or In-Work Tax Credit (Sweden) are more complex or articulated but from the household's viewpoint essentially boil down to a means tested WS: they are therefore rather close to our stylized WS. On the positive side, they introduce an incentive to work and reduce the "dependence on welfare": as a matter of fact, they have been introduced in countries that traditionally adopted policies closer to GMI. On the negative side, they only address the working population and leave open the issues related to the "hard" non-participants.
GMI with WS and UBI with WS
GMI with WS and UBI with WS are mixed mechanisms where the transfer is coupled with the WS. GMI with WS denotes a mechanism envisaging a GMI equal to G/2 coupled with a WS as defined above. Analogously, UBI with WS envisages an unconditional transfer equal to G/2 coupled with a WS. Therefore, with these mixed policies, the alternative levels of coverage become 25%, 37.5% and 50%. We design here a less generous transfer as compared to the "pure" versions of GMI or UBI, because on top of the transfer we also have a subsidy on Designing a Universal Income Support Mechanism for Italy the wage rate. These mixed mechanisms might be interpreted as an attempt to merge the benefits and cancelling the drawbacks of the transfer-based policies (GMI and UBI) and the subsidy-based policies (WS).
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For each one of the above five types of mechanisms, we consider three versions where G is alternatively defined as 50%, 75% or 100% of the Poverty Level. Altogether we have therefore 15 reforms.
The income support mechanism is coupled with a progressive tax that replicates the current system: the marginal tax rates are applied to the whole income exceeding G and proportionally adjusted in the simulation in order to fulfill the public budget constraint. 
Measuring and evaluating the reforms
In order to measure and evaluate the effects of the reforms, we must address two problems. First, how do we estimate the effects of the reforms? Second, how do we evaluate and compare them? To answer the first issue, we have developed a microeconometric model, i.e. a computer program that simulates the new labour supply choices made by the households given the new incentives and constraints implied by the different hypothetical reforms. The new choices generate new income levels, new taxes paid, new benefits received, etc. For example, the program might specify that a wife with given socio-demographic characteristics, voluntarily not working under the current tax-benefit regime, would choose to work provided that her prospective wage rate were increased by at least 10% and that at least 50% of her fixed cost of working (commuting costs, etc.) were covered by some income support policy. Such empirical representations of preferences and hypothetical new choices are built upon a statistical analysis of how the observed current choices depend on the personal characteristics and on the configuration of incentives (wage rates, transfers, taxes, fixed costs, etc.). The data necessary for the statistical analysis are provided by a sample of Italian couples and 4 A mixed system close to GMI and WS has been proposed in Italy by De Vincenti and Paladini (2009). 5 We have also simulated the same reforms coupled with a flat tax instead of the progressive tax. However, the progressive versions in most cases perform better than the flat versions (according to the criteria to be discussed in Section 4): therefore we decided to report (in Section 5) only the result for the progressive versions of the reforms. The results of the flat versions of the reforms are available upon request from the author. Each reform defines a new opportunity set for each individual, i.e. a menu of alternative "jobs" to choose among, including the alternative of not working on the market. A "job" is a package containing an amount of income and the effort (hours of work) required to attain that income given the wage rate, other exogenous resources and the tax-benefit system. The model assumes that the individual prefers more income for a given level of effort (and less effort for a given level of income). What the analysis of the data (the observed choices) essentially does is to estimate the relative weight the individual preferences put on effort and income. By using these estimates, the econometric model tells us which job each individual would choose within the opportunity set defined by any given policy. The simulation of a given reform consists of replacing the current opportunity set with the one defined by the reform and then identifying the preferred choices. Once the choices are identified, we can derive from them all the behavioural and fiscal implications of each reform.
We turn now to the second issue raised at the beginning of this Section: how do we evaluate and compare the reforms? In Section 5 we present results on various measures (employment, income, poverty rate, taxes, etc.) that can assist the evaluation and the comparison of reforms under many different criteria.
6 The microeconometric model is similar to -although more general than -the one used in Colombino et al. (2010) and it is fully explained in Colombino (2011a Colombino ( , 2011b Colombino ( , 2012 . Useful surveys of models for the design and the evaluation of taxation and social policy reforms are provided by Creedy and Kalb (2005) and Bourguignon and Spadaro (2006) . 7 EUROMOD is a tax-benefit microsimulation model for the European Union. It was originally designed by a research team under the direction of Holly Sutherland at the Department of Economics in Cambridge, UK. It is now developed and updated at the Microsimulation Unit at ISER (University of Essex, UK). 8 More recent surveys are of course available. However, the years following 2000 envisage a more turbulent macroeconomic scenario as compared with 1998. In any case, the analysis presented in this paper is a comparative statics exercise: it concerns the evaluation and design of institutions, i.e. policies that should be assumed to stay for a relatively long period. As a counterpart, preferences should be assumed to be stable.
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However, we also present a more sophisticated measure of social welfare. First, we compute an index of individual household welfare, i.e. how well-off is each household given a specific reform: the details go beyond the scope of this paper, but intuitively the index combines the level of income, the amount of leisure and personal characteristics. Next we can compute the so-called Gina Social Welfare (GSW) as follows:
The Gini index is a popular measure of dispersion or inequality (of the households' welfare, in this case). It is a number between 0 and 1, the closer to 0 the more equal the distribution. Therefore, if we compute (1 -Gini Index) we get a number that has the natural interpretation of a measure of equality. The intuition behind the above definition of GSW goes as follows. Each households receives a slice of the "cake": the first term (Average Household Welfare) is the average size of the slice and can be interpreted as a measure of efficiency; the second term (1 -Gini Index) tells us how equal the slices are. Therefore we get the nice interpretation that social welfare is measured as the product of efficiency and equality. A similar intuitive idea was originally introduced by Sen (1976) but applied to the distribution of income rather than welfare. Another useful interpretation is the following. Suppose you have to choose between two alternative tax-transfer regimes but you do not know in advance what position you will occupy (i.e. whether you will be more or less well-off), then it turns out that the rational choice for you would be choosing the regime with the highest value of GSW. 9 In conclusion, the GSW index offers a well-founded method of comparing the reforms.
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The policy simulation procedure adopted in this paper has two distinctive features that are not common in the tax reform literature. First, the reforms are simulated under the constraint of being fiscally neutral, i.e. the difference between the total tax revenue collected under the reform minus the total benefits paid must be the same as under the current system, taking into account the new choices made by the households under the reforms. When considering a specific reform proposal, a more common procedure consists of 9 A formal treatment of a more general class of social welfare indeces is provided by Aaberge (2007) . 10 The simulation and evaluation procedure explained above does not take into account (due to data and modelling limitations) the administrative costs of the different policies.
simply simulating its performance and checking to what extent it implies a deficit or a surplus in the public budget. However, in this paper we are comparing alternative broad approaches or directions of reforms: a comparison among them and with the current regime only makes sense if we keep unchanged the net tax revenue: otherwise one could design reforms that are preferable to the current system by simply making them more and more generous without accounting for the public budget deficit. Second, the simulation is performed under market equilibrium conditions. In general, the reforms induce a shift of the labour supply curve. Most of the simulation exercises for evaluation of reforms assume that any increase or decrease in labour supply is absorbed by labour demand at the current wage. However, in general the equilibrium on the labour market requires an adjustment of the wage rates. Figure 1 illustrates an example. The pre-reform equilibrium is determined by the labour supply curve S and the labour demand curve D. Their intersection identifies the equilibrium wage w and the equilibrium employment n. Let us suppose that the reform induces a shift to the left of the labour supply curve from S to S' (e.g. because a more generous income support policy allows to spend more time in activities outside the labour market). Given the labour demand curve, the post-reform equilibrium implies an increase of the wage rate from w to w' and a decrease of employment from n to n'. The standard reform simulation procedure would instead assume that the wage rate remains unchanged and would identify n* as the post-reform level of employment, with an overestimation of the (negative) effect of the reform on employment. In Designing a Universal Income Support Mechanism for Italy general, not accounting for the equilibrium adjustment on the labour market leads to overestimating the (positive or negative) employment effects of the reforms. We account for the equilibrium adjustment by adopting a simulation procedure (presented in detail by Colombino [2012] ) that is specifically appropriate for our microeconometric model.
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5 Results Table 1 reports some results of the simulations.
12 The reforms are identified by the content of the first two columns: the income support mechanism (GMI, etc.) and the coverage, i.e. the value of G (defined in Section 3) as a percentage of the Poverty Level. The policies are ranked in descending order (the best one at the top) according to the GSW index defined in Section 4. The column "Annual Social Welfare Gain" report the change in the GSW index express in Euros. For example, the 528 Euros corresponding to the policy UBI and WS (coverage = 37.5) means that the Government (or whatever authority is responsible for the reform) judges the overall social benefit of the reform as equivalent to a "gift" of 528 Euros to every household every year (keeping the current policy unchanged). The best policy -according to the GSW criterion -turns out to be UBI and WS with a 37.5% coverage. It pays an average monthly benefit equal to 721 Euros (comprehensive of the unconditional transfer and of the WS), which amounts to about 2.7% of the average monthly net household income and to about 70% of the Poverty Level. It leads to a reduction of the head count poverty ratio (i.e. the percentage of households below the Poverty Level) from 4.33% to 0.95%. The reform requires a 11.6% increase of the marginal tax rates applied to the income brackets above the Poverty Level, which implies that the top marginal tax rate should be raised from 45% to 50.2%. Of course the reform could be financed through different channels such as taxes on consumption, property taxes, taxes on capital, etc. Under this reform, 69% of the households would be better-off ("winners"). Note that the policy ranking according to the Social Welfare Gain 11 The equilibrium simulation procedure requires us to make an assumption about the value of the elasticity of labour demand. The results reported here are those obtained under the assumption that the labour demand elasticity is equal to −1, which belongs to the range of the most common empirical estimates. The equilibrium simulation procedure assumes the simplest possible scenario, i.e. a competitive labour market. It can be extended to accommodate for different adjustment processes, e.g. union bargaining. These extensions are left for future work.
12 The monetary figures of Table 1 can be updated to 2010 by multiplying them by 1.377. Head count poverty ratio:
Percentage of households below the Poverty Level (as defined on the pre-reform income distribution).
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does not correspond to the ranking according to the percentage of winners: social welfare does not only depend on the number of winners but also on how much households win or lose and on how the gains and the losses are distributed among the households. With the exception of the GMI (coverage = 100), the simulated reforms turn out to dominate the current system in terms of social welfare: therefore, we have a large set of alternatives to choose among according to different criteria. For example, reforms of the GMI, WS or GMI and WS type on the one hand require a lower marginal tax burden, but on the other hand are less effective (with respect to UBI or UBI with WS) in reducing poverty.
The mechanisms envisaging unconditional transfers (UBI or UBI with WS) rank better than the means-tested ones. The greater generosity of the unconditional transfers is compensated by the lack of poverty-trap effects, so that both the conditional and the unconditional systems imply very modest reductions in labour supply; however, the unconditional systems perform better in favouring distributional equity and reducing poverty. It must be added that there are two features that we are not able to account for in our simulation exercise (and already mentioned in Section 3) that would make the unconditional policies even more preferable when compared to the conditional ones. First, the Italian "black" or "hidden" economy is large and full of "opportunities": means-tested policies obviously activate the incentive to hide at least part of the income-generating activities. Second, unconditional policies are cheaper to administer.
In Section 2, we observed that the current system implements approximately a sort of quasi-GMI. In fact, Table 1 reveals that the Social Welfare performance of the current system is not so far from most versions of GMI reforms.
Frequent objections against universalistic policies of income support are motivated by the expectation of strong disincentive effects on labour supply (here measured as hours worked) and high tax rates required by the public budget constraint. The first expectation is not supported by our results. We observe some modest reductions of female labour supply (except for WS, which actually leads to an increase in female supply) and hardly significant variations of male labour supply. The second expectation instead is confirmed by our results. The "optimal" reform (according to the GSW criterion) would require a top marginal tax rate equal to 50.2%, to be compared with the 45.0% required by the current system. These figures are high but not at all unrealistic if compared, for example, to the top marginal tax rates in the Scandinavian countries. Even if the above tax rates were judged, for some reason, not feasible (possibly from the point of view of political consensus), it must be remembered that the menu of welfare improving reforms is very large and contains policies requiring lower marginal tax rates. Moreover, instead of increasing the marginal tax rates on income, one might think of a different structure of taxation, e.g. increasing taxes on wealth and/or on (selected) consumption expenditures.
Conclusions
The current Italian system of income support appears as the result of not well-designed choices and implicitly implements a sort of categorical, selective and somehow chaotic "GMI." A reform in the direction of universalism has long been needed and is even more urgent now due to the macroeconomic crisis and its labour market repercussions. Using a microeconometric model that simulates the households' choices and attained welfare levels together with a social welfare measurement methodology, we have performed an empirical evaluation of various alternative policies. A universal income support for Italy appears to be feasible and beneficial, with a large menu of choices available to the policy makers. According to the Gini Social Welfare function, many hypothetical reforms rank better than the current system. The best policy turns out to be an UBI (a universal transfer that on average would cover 37.5% of the Poverty Level) coupled with a 10% WS. The total average benefit received by each household would amount to about 70% of the Poverty Level. Our exercise assumes that, in order to keep a balanced public budget, the policy is financed through personal income taxation. Under this assumption, the optimal policy would require an 11.6% increase in the marginal tax rates, with the top marginal tax rate reaching 50.2%.
Appendix
In this Appendix, we provide a graphical illustration of the reforms described in Section 3. On the horizontal and vertical axes, we measure respectively the pretax gross income and the net available income (i.e. the income attained once taxes are subtracted from and benefits are added to the gross income). Given any level of gross income, the solid line represents the corresponding level of net income. Figure 2 represents the GMI policy. As long as the pre-tax gross income falls below G, the net available income is G, since the individual receives a transfer that covers the difference between G and the pre-tax gross income. If the pre-tax Designing a Universal Income Support Mechanism for Italy gross income is larger than G, then the individual does not receive any transfer and pays taxes on the part of income exceeding G: therefore in this case the net available income is lower than the pre-tax gross income, i.e. the solid line is below the 45°(dotted) line.
UBI is illustrated in Figure 3 . Irrespective of the level of gross income, the individual receives a transfer equal to G and pays taxes on the part of income exceeding G. With WS (Figure 4 ) the individual's income is subsidized as long as it falls below G.
Figures 5 and 6 illustrate the mixed systems GMI and WS and UBI and WS, where with GMI and WS the individual has a GMI equal to G/2 while with UBI and WS (Figure 6 ), the individual receives an unconditional transfer equal to G/2. In both case, the individual income is subsidized up to G. 
